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Municipal and State Sanctuary

Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism
or Improper Dictates?
Jorge L. Carro*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 3, 1983, the Madison, Wisconsin, City Council passed a resolution supporting those churches in the city offering sanctuary to alleged refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.1 Since then,
approximately twenty municipalities have passed resolutions or ordinances declaring themselves to be, inter alia, sanctuaries, thus giving
their imprimatur to groups sheltering undocumented aliens from apprehension by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).2
Executive declarations in three other cities offer similar support for
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., University of
Havana, 1950, M.L.S., Kansas State Teachers College, 1969; B.A., Havana Institute,
1945. I wish to acknowledge the valuable contribution of David D. Jividen of the University of Cincinnati College of Law, class of 1986.
1. Madison, Wis., Res. 39,105 (June 7, 1983).
2. Fargo, N.D., Res. Urging Federal Authorities to Grant Extended Voluntary
Departure Status to Refugees or Temporarily Suspend Deportation of Refugees from
Central America (July 14, 1986); Oakland, Cal., Res. 63950 (July 8, 1986); Rochester,
N.Y., Res. 86-29 (May 27, 1986); Davis, Cal., Res. 5407 (Mar. 5, 1986); Los Angeles, Cal.,
Res. C.F. 85-1948, rescinded by Motion 51 (Feb. 7, 1986); Seattle, Wash., Res. 27402
(Jan. 13, 1986) (repealed on Nov. 4, 1986); San Francisco, Cal., Res. 1087-85 (Dec. 27,
1985); Sacramento, Cal., Res. 85-973 (Dec. 17, 1985); West Hollywood, Cal., Res. 129
(Nov. 25, 1985); Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1985-63 (Oct. 28, 1985); Takoma Park,
Md., Res. 1985-29 (Oct. 28, 1985); Olympia, Wash., Res. M-1192 (Aug. 30, 1985); Ithaca,
N.Y., Res. Sanctuary For Salvadoran and Guatemalan Refugees (July 17, 1985); Cambridge, Mass., Res. Declaring the City a Sanctuary (Apr. 8, 1985); Burlington, Vt., Res.
Relating to Support for Efforts to Provide Sanctuary to Refugees Fleeing El Salvador
and Guatemala (Apr. 4, 1985); Madison, Wis., Res. 41,075 (Mar. 5, 1985); Minneapolis,
Minn., Res. 85R-042 (Feb. 22, 1985); Berkeley, Cal., Res. 52,596 (Feb. 19, 1985); Brookline, Mass., Res. Concerning Sanctuary for Refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Haiti, art. 24 (1985); Duluth, Minn., Res. 84-0485R (July 2, 1984); San Jose, Cal., Res.
Concerning U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Enforcement Policies (Apr.
24, 1984); Madison, Wis., Res., supra note 1.

illegal aliens and those who harbor them. 3 Moreover, two state legislatures and two governors have responded in analogous fashion, with
some even proclaiming their states as sanctuary havens.4
These municipal and state declarations constitute a different dimension in the six-year sanctuary movement: an ecumenical network
opposed to United States policy in Central America which transports
and harbors undocumented aliens in the United States.5 These actions by sanctuary activists are specifically prohibited by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which makes the smuggling,
harboring, transporting, or encouraging of illegal aliens a felony.6
Although closely intertwined with the ecumenical or church sanctuary,7 this article focuses on the municipal and state aspects of the
sanctuary movement.
This article first analyzes the pertinent federal immigration law
which addresses the substantive issues raised by these local declarations, with particular attention paid to penalty and enforcement provisions of the INA. Next, the resolutions, ordinances, and
proclamations of various municipal and state sanctuary actions are
examined. Finally, the rational underpinnings and constitutionality
of these declarations are discussed. The article concludes with some
3. Chicago, Ill., Exec. Order No. 85-1 (Mar. 7, 1985); Detroit, Mich., Exec. Order
No. 26 (Sept. 30, 1987); Koch Memo Directs City Workers Not to Report Illegal Aliens
to US., N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
4. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION: SANCTUARY

FOR GUATEMALANS

AND SALVADORANS, Res. 95147-03-6 (June 3, 1986) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE RESOLUTION]; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, A MEMORIAL REQUESTING CONSIDERATION FOR THE REFUGEES FROM EL SALVADOR, 37th Legis., 1st
Sess., (House Mem. 5, 1985) [hereinafter N.M. HOUSE MEMORIAL 5]; OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, SANCTUARY PROCLAMATION (Mar. 28, 1986)
(Governor Toney Anaya declares New Mexico a "Sanctuary State") [hereinafter N.M.
SANCTUARY

PROCLAMATION]; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF

MASSACHUSETTS, REFUGEE POLICY, Exec. Order No. 257 (Oct. 4, 1985) (Governor
Michael Dukakis establishes a refugee policy for The Commonwealth) [hereinafter
MASS. REFUGEE POLICY]; see Assembly Approves Sanctuary Resolution, United Press
Int'l, Albany, N.Y., July 12, 1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file).
5. See Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous
Misinterpretationof An Abandoned Ancient Privilege, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (1986);
Cooper, Some Cities Battle Administration Over Asylum for Central Americans, 18
NAT'L J. 150-56 (No. 3, Jan. 18, 1986); Fleming, The Ethics of Sanctuary, 1 THE WORLD
& I 613 (No. 7, July 1986); Francis, The Ideology of Sanctuary, 1 THE WORLD & I 585
(No. 7, July 1986); Ruffin, The Politicsof Selective Compassion, 1 THE WORLD & I 594
(No. 7, July 1986); A Symposium on the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1
(1986). For a perspective from the leaders and supporters of the sanctuary movement,
see I. BAU, THIS GROUND Is HOLY (1985); Corbett, The Social Dynamics of the Sanctuary Movement, 1 THE WORLD & I 547 (No. 7, July 1986); MacEoin, Law, Conscience,
and the Sanctuary Movement, 1 THE WORLD & I 573 (No. 7, July 1986); McGuire, Sanctuary, 19 INT'L L. & POL. 631 (1987); Riordan, The Sanctuary Movement: Above the
Law or Beyond Its Reach, 4 HUM. RTS. ANN. 137 (1987).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982).
7. See Cooper, supra note 5, at 150-56; see infra notes 86-87 for municipal expressions of support and commendation for those in the sanctuary movement.
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comments on the ramifications of and the dangers posed by these
municipal and state actions.
II.
A.

FEDERAL PROHIBITIONS AND STATE ENFORCEMENT

The CongressionalBan on Concealing,Harboring,or Shielding

The concealing or harboring of undocumented aliens was first prohibited by an act passed in 19178 making it a misdemeanor to conceal
or harbor, or attempt to or assist another to conceal or harbor illegal
aliens. 9 In 1948, the punishment provision of the 1917 act was vitiated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Evans.10 Although
the Court in Evans agreed that Congress meant to "make criminal
and to punish acts of concealing or harboring,"" it found that the
statute's ambiguity as to both the scope of the prohibited acts and the
penalties proscribed for their violation rendered the law
12
unenforceable.
The section of the 1917 act prohibiting the concealing or harboring
of illegal aliens was redrafted in 1952 when the United States Congress enacted the INA.13 Cognizant of the Supreme Court's holding
in Evans, Congress modified the penalties for and language prohibit8. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874. Bringing in or landing or attempts to bring in or land illegal aliens was prohibited by statute in 1907. Act of Feb.
19, 1907, 34 Stat. 897, 900. To "knowingly or willfully hold, or attempt to hold any woman" for purposes of prostitution was first made a felony in 1875. Act of March 3,
1875, 18 Stat. 477.
9. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874, 880. This section reads:
That any person, including the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any vessel, who shall bring into or land in the United States, by vessel or otherwise,
or shall attempt, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in the
United States, by vessel or otherwise, or shall conceal or harbor, or attempt to
conceal or harbor, or assist or abet another to conceal or harbor in any place,
including any building, vessel, railway car, conveyance, or vehicle, any alien
not duly admitted by an immigrant inspector or not lawfully entitled to enter
or to reside within the United States under the terms of this Act, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, for each and every alien so landed or brought in or
attempted to be landed or brought in.

Id.
10. 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
11. Id. at 495.
12. Id.
13. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
The Act revised and codified existing laws relating to immigration and naturalization.
For a thorough analysis of the 1952 Act and the subsequent amendments thereto, see
0. TRELLES & J. BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AcTS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1979).

ing the concealing or harboring of undocumented aliens.14 Section
1324(a) of the INA increased the penalty for willfully or knowingly
concealing, harboring, or shielding from detection any alien, or attempting to do the same, from a misdemeanor to a felony and increased the possible punishment to either a $2,000 fine or
imprisonment for up to five years or both for each alien involved. 15
More importantly, Congress also indicated in the redrafted statute
who was authorized to make arrests for violations of section 1324.
Specifically, section 1324(c) authorizes the enforcement of section
1324(a) by "officers and employees of the Service designated by the
Attorney General, either individually or as a member of a class, and
all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws. ' ' 16 The
phrase "all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws"
14. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 71, reprintedin 1952 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1724. Specifically, the House Report states that the section was
modified "in light of the decision of the Supreme Court of The United States in the
case of United States v. Evans....
Id. (citation omitted).
15. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 274(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a) (1982)). In its entirety, section 1324(a) reads:
(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding officer, agent, or consignee of any means of transportation who(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring
into or land in the United States, by any means of transportation or
otherwise;
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the
United States occurred less than three years prior thereto, transports,
or moves, or attempts to transport or move, within the United States
by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law;
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or
attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any place, including any building or any means of transportation; or
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the
United States ofany alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the
United States under the terms of this Act or any other law relating to
the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
$2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or
both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection
occurs: Provided, however, That for the purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.
Id. By virtue of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (1986), a new section 274A was added, making unlawful the employment
of aliens.
16. The Immigration of Nationality Act of 1952, § 274(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(c) (1982)). As codified, section 1324(c) reads:
(b) No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrest for a violation of any provision of this section except officers and employees of the
Service designated by the Attorney General, either individually or as a
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reflects Congress's intent to give local police officers the authority to
arrest those violating the section 1324(a) prohibition against bringing
7
in, harboring, or shielding undocumented aliens.1
Another major piece of immigration legislation passed by Congress,
the Refugee Act of 1980,18 left intact the prohibition against harboring or shielding illegal aliens, as well as the authority of local law enforcement officials to arrest individuals violating these provisions.

Subsequent immigration legislation enacted by Congress has not altered the scope of these provisions. 19
B.

State Enforcement of FederalImmigration Law

Although Congress clearly authorizes local police enforcement 'of
federal immigration law, 20 a standard for arrest under that section
has not been promulgated. In situations where a federal standard for
arrest is nonexistent, the United States Supreme Court holds that
the standard for the validity of an arrest is determined by the law of
2
the state where the arrest takes place. 1
member of a class, and all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws.

Id.
17. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1505, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1357, 1358. Specifically, the Senate version of the bill limited
enforcement authority to officers of the United States. A House amendment, however,
struck out the words "of the United States" so that "other officers whose duty it is to
enforce criminal laws would have authority to make an arrest for a violation of the
act." Id.; see also Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 772 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983); People v.
Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (1978).
18. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The Refugee
Act established a comprehensive refugee resettlement and assistance policy while codifying the right of asylum in the United States. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 141, 142.
19. Congress has recently enacted three major pieces of legislation regulating immigration: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986), The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986), and The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (1986). None of these laws have affected the provisions of section 1324 containing the comprehensive language regarding
the harboring of aliens which has been broadly construed by the courts. See infra
notes 35-53 and accompanying text for court decisions construing section 1324.
20. Id.; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421 (1976); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
39 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); United States v.
Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 565 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Swarowski, 557
F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Leland, 376 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (D. Del.
1974); see also 66 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 497, 500 (1983). For a discussion of the validity of

Accordingly, in Gonzales v. City of Peoria,the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals analyzed Arizona's misdemeanor statute to determine
whether state law authorized local police to enforce the criminal provisions of the INA.22 In Gonzales, eleven plaintiffs of Mexican descent sued the City of Peoria, Arizona, and several Peoria city
officials charging that they were unlawfully stopped, questioned, and
detained by city police in violation of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.23
Upholding the trial court's judgment for the defendants, the Ninth
Circuit first noted that federal law did not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA, including the misdemeanor offenses for which the plaintiffs were previously arrested.24
The Court then considered whether state law gave the Peoria police
authority to arrest the plaintiffs for INA violations.25 In its analysis,
the Gonzales court closely examined whether Arizona's misdemeanor
statute gave arresting city police discretion to release persons arrested for misdemeanors occurring outside the officer's presence. 26
Concluding that Arizona's statute did give police this discretion, the
arrest and custody of plaintiffs for violation of the INA was upheld
by the Ninth Circuit and the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit was
27
sustained.
Prior to Gonzales a California Court of Appeal, in People v.
Baraas,rejected the assertion that local police must comply with the
INA's warrant requirements instead of state law when arresting suspects for violations of the INA.28 Like the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales,
the court in Barajas first held that local police officers were not precluded from enforcing the INA. The court further held that Congress left the determination of the validity of state arrests for INA
violations to the law of the state in which the arrest occurs. 29 The
California court then analyzed whether the local arresting officer
arrests by local authorities for violations of federal immigration law, see infra notes
24-34 and accompanying text.
22. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1983).
23. Id
24. Id at 475. The plaintiffs in Gonzales were arrested for violating the INA provisions prohibiting the unauthorized entry of aliens as well as those prohibiting reentry by previously deported aliens. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-1326 (1982). The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, after reviewing the INA's legislative history, that
local police are authorized to enforce sections 1325 and 1326. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 476.
27. Id
28. People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (1978). In
Barajas, local police arrested the defendant for violating INA sections 1325 and 1326.
Id
d
29. Id at 1006-07, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
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had "reasonable cause" to arrest the defendant for violating provisions of the INA prohibiting illegal entry after deportation.30
These cases illustrate that the validity of local arrests for violating
the INA provisions prohibiting the inducing, harboring, or shielding
of undocumented aliens turns on the authority granted by each state
to local police officers to effectuate arrests for felony violations.31 In
each of the nine states in which municipal or state declarations of
sanctuary have occurred, 32 either state statute or common law authorizes police officers, upon reasonable cause, to make warrantless arrests of persons committing a felony, whether or not in the officer's
presence.3 3 Moreover, statutes in two of these nine states specifically
grant immigration and naturalization officers the authority to make
warrantless arrests if, inter alia, the officer has cause to believe a felony has been committed. 34 In sum, local police officers, through an
express grant of authority by Congress, are empowered to enforce
section 1324 of the INA, drawing their authority to arrest offenders
from state statute or common law.
C. The Scope of Activity Proscribed by Section 1324
Courts broadly construe the section 1324 prohibitions against harboring, shielding, or inducing the entry of illegal aliens in the United
30. Id. at 1007, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 199. The Court in Barajas subsequently held that
the local officers had "ample" probable cause for suspecting a violation of sections 1325
or 1326. Id. at 1008, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
31. Unlike sections 1325 and 1326, violations of section 1324 of the INA are classified as felonies, with possible maximum sentences ranging from a $2,000 fine to five
years in prison for each illegal alien so aided. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982); see supra note
15 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 1-4 for cities and states making sanctuary declarations.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B (Supp.
1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-1-1 to 1-7
(1978) (The New Mexico statute is interpreted in State v. Barreras, 64 N.M. 300, 328
P.2d 74 (1958), State v. Hudman, 78 N.M. 370, 431 P.2d 748 (1967), and City of Roswell
v. Mayer, 78 N.M. 533, 433 P.2d 757, (1967).); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §§ 140.05, .10 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.31,
.100 (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.07 (West 1985). In Massachusetts, court decisions have established that police officers are authorized to arrest without a warrant if
reasonable influences drawn from observable facts warrant the officer's belief that the
defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 380 N.E.2d 669 (1978); Commonwealth v. McShan,
15 Mass. App. 921, 444 N.E.2d 948 (1983).
34. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34(2) (West Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15(2)
(Supp. 1987). In Washington, aliens incarcerated in any jail or institution supported by
public funds must be reported immediately to U.S. immigration authorities. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN.

§ 10.70.140 (1980).

States. In United States v. Cantu,35 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals held that section 1324 prohibits activity "tending substantially
to facilitate an alien's 'remaining in the United States illegally,'" as
well as activity relating to the actual smuggling of aliens.36 In Cantu,
the defendant arranged for an illegal alien who worked in his restaurant to leave with a patron through the front door in an attempt to
evade INS agents who had arrived to question employees about their
residence status.3 7 This action was sufficient to uphold the defendant's conviction for shielding illegal aliens in violation of section
1324.38

Similarly, in United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez,39 the Fifth Circuit
ruled that merely warning an alien of the presence of immigration
officers and thereby aiding his escape is within the scope of activity
prohibited by the INA under section 1324.40 The defendant's conviction for warning illegal aliens working at a materials company that
"immigration is here" was accordingly sustained.41
Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Second
Circuits have construed the word "harbor" to mean "afford shelter
to" as opposed to "preventing detection by law enforcement
agents." 42 In the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Acosta de Evans,43 the defendant was arrested when immigration officials found

five aliens, at least one of whom she knew was in the country illegally, living at her apartment.44 The court held that the purpose of
section 1324 of the INA was to "keep unauthorized aliens from entering or remaining in the country." 45 It found that "this purpose is
best effectuated by construing 'harbor' to mean 'afford shelter to.'"46
In the Second Circuit case of United States v. Lopez 47 the defendant provided shelter in several single family residences to twentyseven aliens he knew to be illegally in the country. 48 The defendant
also helped some of the aliens obtain employment by filling out their
job applications, transporting them to and from work, and also ar35. 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 1180 (citing with approval United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1976)).
37. Id. at 1175.
38. Id. at 1180.
39. 674 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 1072.

41. Id. at 1070.
42. United States v. Acosta De Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975).
43. 531 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 429.
45. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).

46. Id.
47. 521 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975).
48. Id. at 439, 441.
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ranging sham marriages for them. 49 As in Acosta de Evans, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "harboring" prohibition of
section 1324 was "intended to encompass conduct tending substantially to facilitate [a known] alien's 'remaining in the United States
illegally.' "50 The Court also indicated that simply providing shelter
might be prohibited by the INA.51
Inducing and encouraging wrongful entry into the country is prohibited by section 1324, even if such acts take place abroad. For example, in United States v. Nunez,5 2 the First Circuit held the
defendant criminally liable for acts of inducing or encouraging the
unlawful entry of illegal aliens into the United States even though
these actions took place in the Dominican Republic.53
In general, the scope of section 1324 has been construed by the
courts to cover activity which substantiallyfacilitates the entry or
stay of illegal aliens in the United States. Warning undocumented
aliens of the presence of law enforcement officers, providing them
with housing, and inducing them to enter the country have specifically been held violative of section 1324's prohibition against shielding, harboring, or inducing illegal aliens. In particular, the entire
gambit of activities by those engaged in the sanctuary movement,
from transporting undocumented aliens to sheltering and concealing
them from detection by INS officials is clearly prohibited by section
1324 of the INA. The focus will now turn to the declarations of local
and state governments regarding the sanctuary movement, both with
respect to their factual basis and their constitutionality in light of
section 1324's prohibition.
III.
A.

THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF SANCTUARY DECLARATIONS

An Overview

Although the illegality of the sanctuary movement is beyond question, as of September 1987, twenty-one city councils, three mayors,
two state legislatures, and two governors have issued sanctuary declarations or their equivalent.5 4 In contrast, lost amid the publicity surrounding these actions is the fact that one city has rescinded and
49. Id. at 439.
50. Id. at 441.
51. Id.
52. 668 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1981).
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the contgnts of
these resolutions, see infra notes 62-133 and accompanying text.

revised a prior declaration,55 one city sanctuary declaration has already been withdrawn by its sponsor after opposition was manifested,56 and still another has been defeated.57 Moreover, one
sanctuary resolution was actually repealed by voters in November
1986.58 Only one city thus far has officially opposed the sanctuary
movement with an antisanctuary resolution;5 9 however, several governors have stated their opposition to the concept of state
60
sanctuary.
Although by no means a pressing concern on the agenda of local
government, 61 the sanctuary declarations are an example of state
government actions in areas heretofore considered the exclusive domain of the federal government. Since their propriety is questionable at best, and their constitutionality highly suspect at worst, the
factual basis for and operative provisions of these sanctuary declarations merit close analysis.
B.

The Municipal Declarations
1.

The Method

The municipalities that have promulgated sanctuary declarations
have done so either through resolutions6 2 or ordinances. 63 In general, ordinances are measures which prescribe a permanent rule of
conduct or government,6 4 while resolutions are acts of temporary
character.65 The courts, however, commonly hold that the name af55. Los Angeles, Cal., Res., supra note 2.
56. Mayor Withdraws Sanctuary Resolution, United Press Int'l, Austin, Tex., Apr.
18, 1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file).
57. Fogarty, Council Kills Sanctuary Resolution, Des Moines Reg., Apr. 29, 1986.
58. Seattle 'Sanctuary'DeclarationDefeated, United Press Int'l, Nov. 6, 1986 (national desk distribution) (NEXIS library, Omni file). Commenting on the rejection of
the sanctuary movement by the voters, Roger Conner, executive director of the Washington-based Federation for American Immigration Reform, stated that "[1]ocal officials should look at the facts before endorsing the views of small political groups
advocating illegal immigration and defiance of federal law." Id.
59. Monterey Park, Cal., Res. 9004 (June 5, 1986).
60. United Press Int'l, Phoenix, Ariz., May 1, 1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file) (Arizona Governor Bruce Babbit declines to declare Arizona a sanctuary); Enda, Lamm,
Sanctuary Activists Clash on Refugee Issue, Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 6, 1986 (Colorado Governor Richard Lamm blasts American cities granting sanctuary to Central
American refugees).
61. Although urged to do so by sanctuary proponents, the National League of Cities, an association of cities formed to represent their collective interests, has not seen
fit to include it on the agenda of its annual meetings, nor has the Association of Local
County Commissioners. DeSimone, Seattle Took Similar Initiative Step Further,Ann
Arbor (Mich.) News, Apr. 1, 1986.
62. See, e.g., Madison, Wis., Res., supra note 1; Berkeley, Cal., Res., supra note 2.
63. See, e.g., Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance, supra note 2.
64. See, e.g., C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 115 (1980); 2
C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 11.14 (1981).
65. See, e.g., C. RHYNE, supra note 64, at 115; C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, supra note
64, § 11.14.
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fixed to a measure is not dispositive, 66 but instead focus on the
method by which the motion was enacted to determine its legal validity.6 7 For example, if a resolution is passed which meets the requirements applicable to ordinances, it can be enforceable as an
68
ordinance.
The majority of municipal sanctuary declarations are passed in accordance with voting formalities and attested to by city clerks. 6 9 In
70
addition, testimony prior to enacting the declarations often occurs,
while in other instances, amendments to the sanctuary declarations
are offered and accepted. 71 At the very least, municipalities having
passed sanctuary resolutions or ordinances did so with the formality
required of official enactments.
2.

The Preambles

All of the municipal declarations begin with several preamble
clauses which state the reasons for the measure's enactment and the
objectives it seeks to attain. 72 Despite purporting to be the result of
"independent" actions, 73 the similarities between preambles of various cities is striking; some preambles are verbatim replicas of another
7
municipality's preamble. 4
The preambles to most municipalities' sanctuary declarations have
several common characteristics, although not necessarily in common
66. See, e.g., R. OSBORNE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 61 (1982); C. RHYNE, suPra
note 64, at 115; C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, supra note 64, § 11.14.
67. R. OSBORNE, supra note 66; C. RHYNE, supra note 64, at 115; C. SANDS & M.
LIBONATI, supra note 64, § 11.14.
68. R. OSBORNE, supra note 66; C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 64, § 11.14.
69. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Los
Angeles, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2; San Francisco,
Cal., ies., supra note 2; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Cambridge, Mass.,
Res., supra note 2; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2; Berkeley, Cal., Res., supra
note 2.
70. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 5, at 150, 154; Reagan Policy Toward Central
America Attacked, United Press Int'l, Los Angeles, Cal., June 30, 1986 (NEXIS library,
Omni file); Ostrom, Sanctuary Favored, But Panel Hears Critics, Seattle Times, July
25, 1985.
71. See, e.g., Fargo, N.D., Res., supra note 2; Los Angeles, Cal., Res., supra note 2;
Burlington, Vt., Res., supra note 2; Duluth, Minn., Res., supra note 2.
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (5th ed. 1979).

73. Helton, Ecumenical,Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee
Policy, 21 HARV. CIV. RTs.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 493, 582 (1986); see also Takoma
Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Cambridge, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Brookline, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 24-3.
74. See infra notes 76-80, 82 and accompanying text for those portions of sanctuary resolutions which are exact replicas of one another.

sequence. Many declarations refer to the city's or nation's immigration heritage.7 5 Also common are references to the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights. For example, municipal resolutions
will often cite the United States' support of the United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights on December 10, 1948, which commits the member states to
recognize and observe basic human rights.7T Many municipal preambles also refer to the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilians in time of war. For example, Sacramento's
resolution states: "[T]he United States, Guatemala and El Salvador,
have ratified on August 12, 1949, the Geneva Convention IV, relative
to the PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR." 7 7 Some refer as well to The Refugee Act of 1980:
.WHEREAS, The United States Refugee Act of 1980 authorizes the grant of
asylum to refugees who are defined in terms identical to the United Nations
1968 Convention as any person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to 8such fear, is unwilling to avail him or herself of
7
protection of that country.
75. See, e.g., Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Los Angeles, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 3; San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; West Hollywood, Cal.,
Res., supra note 2, at 1; Burlington, Vt., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Brookline, Mass., Res.,
supra note 2, at 24-3. In other resolutions, references to the nation's refugee heritage
is made in the operative clause. See, e.g., Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 2. Some
municipal declarations even compare the sanctuary movement to the underground
railroad that helped slaves escape to the North from the pre-Civil War southern states.
See Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2.
76. E.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note
2, at 1; Olympia, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2,
at 1. Resolutions in Ithaca and Rochester also refer to the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights in virtually the same manner. Compare Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2, at 1, with Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 1. For resolutions merely alluding
to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, see Takoma Park, Md., Ord.,
supra note 2, at 1; Duluth, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 1.
77. E.g., Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Olympia, Wash., Res., supra
note 2; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 1. For similar references to the Geneva Convention, see Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; San Francisco, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2, at 2; Duluth, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 1. See generally Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civlian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 (Geneva
Convention IV), in force, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
78. E.g., Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Olympia, Wash., Res., supra
note 2, at 1; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 1. Resolutions in Ithaca and
Rochester also refer to the Refugee Act of 1980 in exactly the same manner. Compare
Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 2, with Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 1.
Other similar references to the Refugee Act can be found in Oakland, Cal., Res., supra
note 2, at 1; Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Los Angeles, Cal., Res., supra note 2,
at 5; Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 1; San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at
1; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note
2, at 2; Cambridge, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Burlington, Vt., Res., supra note 2, at
1; Madison, Wis., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Brookline, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 24-2;
Duluth, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 2. See. generally The Refugee Act of 1980, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
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The 1968 Refugee Protocol is also commonly noted in many municipal sanctuary declarations:
WHEREAS, the United States has acceded to the 1967 United Nations Convention in protocol relating to the status of refugees which states "No contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social
79
group or political opinion.

Frequently mentioned by these declarations is ,the low percentage
of asylum applicants given refugee status80 and the alleged number
of civilians killed in either El Salvador or Guatemala or both.81 Some
municipal declarations assert the dangers deportees face upon return
to their country of origin.8 2 While some preambles mention refugees
from countries other than El Salvador,83 not one sanctuary declara79. E.g., Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Olympia, Wash., Res., supra
note 2, at 1; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 1. For other similar references
to the 1968 Refugee Protocol, see Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 1; San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Ithaca,
N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Burlington, Vt., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Duluth, Minn.,
Res., supra note 2, at 1-2. See generally U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature,Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.

268.
80. "WHEREAS, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees has recognized that persons fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala are bona fide political refugees,
yet fewer than two percent are being granted that status by the U.S. Immigration Service .... See, e.g., Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Madison, Wis., Res., supra note
2, at 1. For similar references to asylum applications, see also Oakland, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1; Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 1; West Hollywood, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 2-3; Ithaca, N.Y., Res.,
supra note 2, at 2; Cambridge, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Burlington, Vt., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1; Brookline, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Duluth, Minn. Res., supra
note 2, at 2.
81. See, e.g., Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra
note 2, at 2; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; Duluth, Minn., Res., supra
note 2, at 2; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 2.
82. The resolutions of Sacramento and Minneapolis contain the exact same
phraseology: "WHEREAS, in 1982 and 1983 over 4,800 refugees were returned to El
Salvador and that the names of 50 of those returned have turned up on lists of victims
" Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at
killed by security forces or death squads ....
2; Minneapolis, Minn., Res.,supra note 2, at 1. For other references to alleged persecution of deportees upon their return to their country of origin, see Oakland, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1; Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1; West Hollywood, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Cambridge, Mass., Res.,
supra note 2, at 1-2; Brookline, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 24-2.
83. For resolutions or ordinances mentioning Guatemala in addition to El Salvador, see generally Fargo, N.D., Res., supra note 2; Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2; San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Sacramento,
Cal., Res., upra note 2; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Takoma Park, Md.,
Ordinance, supra note 2; Olympia, Wash., Res., supra note 2; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2; Burlington, Vt., Res., supra note 2; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2;

tion specifically mentions Nicaragua or Cuba.
According to these preambles, the justifications for these sanctuary
resolutions can be categorized as follows: first, the United States is
obligated to respect its international responsibility not to deport refugees;8 4 second, the United States' continuing deportation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees due to the failure of the INS to grant
these aliens asylum is unconscionable and violative of international
law;85 third, the courageous citizens who are providing sanctuary to
these refugees exemplify those adhering to the law, their conscience,
and this nation's heritage;86 and finally, the sanctuary movement is
87
deserving of municipal support and encouragement.
Berkeley, Cal., Res., supra note 2; Madison, Wis., Res., supra note 2. For resolutions
mentioning countries in addition to Guatemala and El Salvador, see generally Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2 (Haiti, South Africa); Cambridge, Mass., Res., supra note
2 (Haiti); Brookline, Mass., Res., supra note 2 (Haiti). The now-rescinded Los Angeles
resolution contained a reference to Guatemala which was deleted before passage, Los
Angeles, Cal., Res., supra note 2 (committee version of Nov. 22, 1985).
84. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also Helton, supra note 73, at
588. "The unarticulated but pervasive theme of these local actions is that the federal
government, particularly the INS and the executive branch is acting outside of the
law-not the local governments or the Sanctuary Workers." Id. (emphasis in original).
For municipal references to the legal and moral justifications of the sanctuary movement, see infra note 86.
86. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2 (noting that "members of these
religious communities offering sanctuary [do so] in the belief that they are acting in
accordance with international and federal law"); Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1
(claiming that "churches and synagogues and other groups across the nation have
elected to provide sanctuary openly and publicly to Central American refugees, believing this humanitarian work to be in accord with the spirit and letter of international
and United States law"); Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 1 (stating that "Seattle
citizens who have provided sanctuary . .. have done so in an open and public fashion,
believing as a matter of conscience that this is a necessary and humanitarian action");
Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2 (declaring that "these groups and individuals
(protecting and supporting refugees] have acted in a way they consider morally and legally correct"); Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 3 (stating that "other community organizations have publicly declared themselves sanctuaries ... as public witness
against the morally and legally unjustifiable deportation of these people"); Olympia,
Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 2 (proclaiming that "it respects the various sanctuary
groups... for their courage, sensitivity, humanity and willingness to act in accordance
with their conscience"); Burlington, Vt., Res., supra note 2, at 2 (asserting that "groups
and individuals have acted in a way they consider morally and legally correct and in
the best tradition of our country"); Berkeley, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1 (stating that
"groups and individuals have acted in a way they consider morally and legally correct
and in the best tradition of our country").
87. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3 (resolving that "the City Council commends the residents of Oakland who are providing health, food, shelter and
other settlement assistance and friendship to Central American refugees, and commends... groups which have already declared public sanctuary for refugees from Central America"); Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 1-2 (stating that "the City of
Rochester wishes to continue supporting its citizens in their efforts to maintain and
further human rights for its citizens and for all who come within its borders... [and]
recognizes that Rochester has become a 'City of Sanctuaries' underscoring both the
historical and present effort by numerous communities within Rochester to provide
shelter to many fleeing conditions of persecution in their homelands"); Davis, Cal.,
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3.

The Operative Clauses

The operative clauses of municipal sanctuary declarations, which
follow the preambles, consist of several common elements. First,
they usually contain a general declaration of the city as a "sanctuary
city,"8 8 "city of refuge,"8 9 or even "a city of peace." 90 In addition,
many municipalities officially give their support to federal "Extended
Voluntary Departure" (EVD) status for Salvadoran and Guatemalan
refugees.91
Many of the municipal declarations also include a series of orders
prohibiting city employees and departments from requesting9 2 or disseminating 93 information concerning the citizenship or residency staRes., supra note 2, at 2 (resolving that the "City of Davis commend the Davis Religious
Community for Sanctuary"); Seattle, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 3 (proclaiming that
"the City of Seattle recognizes the courage and personal conviction that has caused
many of its residents to offer sanctuary to Central American refugees"); San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2 (noting that "the City and County of San Francisco
commend the Congregations and Religious Orders who have declared sanctuary");
Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 4 (applauding "the actions of Takoma Park
residents who have acted to help Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the City...
and stands in solidarity with churches and other organizations throughout the country
who have provided public sanctuary for Central American refugees"); Burlington, Vt.,
Res., supra note 2, at 2 (resolving that the "City of Burlington supports the principle
of sanctuary"); Berkeley, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 1-2 (commending "the ...groups
which have declared public sanctuary ... [and expressing] its support for any other
group which chooses to declare public sanctuary for Central American refugees");
Madison, Wis., Res., supra note 1 (commending "St. Francis House... for their compassion and moral courage in providing sanctuary to refugees from El Salvador and
Guatemala").
88. See, e.g., Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Los Angeles, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 3-5; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2, at 3; Cambridge, Mass., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Brookline, Mass., Res., supra
note 2, at 24-1.
89. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Seattle, Wash., Res.,supra note
2, at 2; San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Takoma Park, Md., Res., supra
note 2, at 4.
90. Olympia, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 2.
91. See, e.g., Fargo, N.D., Res., supra note 2, at 467; Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2, at 2; Los Angeles, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 4-5; Seattle, Wash., Res., supra
note 2, at 2; San Francisco, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra
note 2, at 3; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Takoma Park, Md., Res.,
supra note 2, at 4; Olympia, Wash., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2, at 3; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Duluth, Minn., Res., supra
note 2, at 3.
92. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra
note 2, at 3; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance, supra note 2, at 1; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 3.
93. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra
note 2, at 3; Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance, supra note 2, at 1; Cambridge Mass., Res.,
supra note 2, at 3.

tus of any person, or investigating, or assisting in the investigation of
such matters94 without legal authority. Also prohibited by numerous
sanctuary declarations is the conditioning of municipal benefits or
services on residency status without authorization.95 Furthermore,
municipalities often request the INS to notify third parties such as
sanctuary organizations should aliens be arrested in proclaimed sanctuaries. 96 Finally, some declarations at the end of the operative
clauses contain a severance clause which preserves the validity of the
declaration should one part be held legally invalid.97
C. Municipal Executive Orders
New York City and Chicago have promulgated executive actions
akin to municipal sanctuary declarations. In an October memorandum, New York Mayor Edward I. Koch directed city agencies not to
report illegal aliens to the INS "unless the alien has given signed permission for a status check or the alien appears to be engaged in some
kind of criminal behavior." 98 The October memorandum also ordered city officials to prepare publications for law abiding illegal
aliens detailing services available to them. 99
Even more similar in tone to municipal sanctuary declarations is
the executive order given by Chicago Mayor Harold Washington.OO
Using the same phraseology found in many municipal sanctuary declarations,o1 the executive order prohibits city employees and departments from requesting information about, 02 disseminating
94. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2-3; Davis, Cal., Res., supra note
2, at 1; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra
note 2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance, supra note 2, at 1; Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra
note 2, at 3; Berkeley, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 2; Brookline, Mass., Res., supra note
2, at 24-1.
95. See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Davis, Cal., Res., supra note 2,
at 1; Sacramento, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 3; West Hollywood, Cal., Res., supra note
2, at 1; Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance, supra note 2, at 1. Cf. Los Angeles, Cal., Res.,
supra note 2, at 4; Rochester, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 2.
96. Ithaca, N.Y., Res., supra note 2, at 3; Minneapolis, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at
2; Duluth, Minn., Res., supra note 2, at 4.
97. Oakland, Cal., Res., supra note 2, at 4; Seattle, Wash., Rs., supra note 2, at 3-4;
Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance, supra note 2, at 2; Cambridge, Mass., Res., supra note
2, at 4.
98. Koch Memo Directs City Workers Not to Report Illegal Aliens to U.S., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
99. Id Patrick F.X. Mulhearn, counsel to the mayor, denies that the October
Memorandum is a sanctuary policy. Id.
100. Chicago, Ill., Exec. Order, supra note 3.
101. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text for municipal sanctuary declarations prohibiting city employees from requesting information about, disseminating information regarding, or investigating or assisting in the investigation of the citizenship
status of any person without legal authority.
102. Chicago, Ill., Exec. Order, supra note 3, § 3.
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information regarding,i 03 or investigating or assisting in the investigation of 1 04 the citizenship or residency status of any person without
legal authority. The order also prohibits the conditioning of city benefits on citizenship or residency status 05 in a manner analogous to
many municipal sanctuary declarations.' 0 6 Additionally, the executive order mandates that applications, questionnaires, and interview
forms used by the city be reviewed in order to delete any questions
07
regarding citizenship or residency status not legally required
D.

State Legislative Actions

Currently, two legislatures have passed resolutions analogous to
municipal sanctuary declarations. On June 3, 1986, New York's State
Assembly passed a resolution declaring New York a sanctuary for
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.108 Like many municipal sanctuary declarations, New York's declaration commends the actions of
citizens, churches, and others who provide asylum to Central American refugees.10 9 Additionally, the Assembly's resolution asks state
employees not to say or do anything that could lead to the deportation of refugees who are abiding by state lawsi10-just as similar mu103. Id. § 4.
104. Id § 3.
105. Id. § 5.
106. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
107. Chicago, Ill., Exec. Order, supra note 3, § 6.
108. N.Y. STATE RESOLUTION, supra note 4.
109. Id. Specifically, the resolution reads: "Resolved, that the State of New York
commend the congregations, religious orders and citizens who have provided asylum
for Salvadorans and Guatemalans ....
Id. The New York Assembly's resolution also
replicates clauses found in many municipal declarations. The Assembly refers, for example, to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and
the United States Refugee Act of 1980. Id.; see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text. The New York Resolution also alludes to the low percentage of asylum applicants given refugee status, as well as to EVD status for Guatemalan and Salvadoran
refugees. Id.; see supra notes 80, 91 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the New
York Resolution quotes the inscription on the Statue of Liberty. Id. Governor Toney
Anaya of New Mexico also quoted the Statue of Liberty's inscription a little more than
two months earlier in his sanctuary proclamation. See N.M. SANCTUARY PROCLAMATION, supra note 4, at 1. Furthermore, the New York Resolution refers to a statement
made by Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero on May 23, 1980; a statement also
quoted in New Mexico's Sanctuary Proclamation. See N.Y. STATE RESOLUTION, supra
note 4; N.M. SANCTUARY PROCLAMATION, supra note 4, at 1.
110. N.Y. STATE RESOLUTION, supra note 4. Specifically, the resolution states:
Resolved, that this assembled body urge the Governor and all chief administrative officers to encourage commissions and departments under their respective jurisdictions not to promote or tolerate any discrimination of Salvadorans

nicipal declarations.11
New Mexico's state legislature also passed a sanctuary resolution,
although it differs in focus from New York's.11 2 Entitled "Requesting Consideration for the Refugees From El Salvador," the New
Mexico resolution focuses exclusively on Salvadoran refugees who
have illegally entered the United States and are facing deportation. 113 The resolution's preamble replicates many municipal sanctuary declarations by noting the number of persons killed in El
Salvador's political turmoil as well as alleging that deportees face imprisonment, persecution, torture, and death upon return to their
country of origin. 114 Finally, like many municipal declarations, the
resolution officially lends support to federal EVD status for
Salvadorans in the United States.115
E. State Executive Actions
In addition to state legislative action, the governors of two states
have also addressed the sanctuary movement. In Massachusetts, Governor Michael S. Dukakis issued an executive order,116 while in New
Mexico, former Governor Toney Anaya issued a sanctuary
proclamation.1 17
Dukakis's executive order contains clauses essentially mirroring
those found in municipal sanctuary declarations. As with analogous
municipal declarations, the executive order makes reference to the
Commonwealth's immigration and refugee heritage.lla Similarly,
Dukakis's executive order also refers to the Refugee Act of 1980,119
and Guatemalans because of their immigration status, or to jeopardize their
welfare by doing or saying anything that would lead to their deportation.
Id.
111. For examples of the similarity of restrictions on government employees found
in municipal sanctuary declarations and the New York State Assembly's sanctuary
declaration, compare N.Y. STATE RESOLUTION, supra note 4 with resolutions found
supra notes 92-94.
112. N.M. HOUSE MEMORIAL 5, supra note 4.
113. Id.
114. Id For similar references to Salvadoran casualties and asserted dangers faced
by deportees, see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
115. Id. For municipal declarations supporting EVD status for Salvadorans illegally
in the United States, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
116. MASS. REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 4.
117. N.M. SANCTUARY PROCLAMATION, supra note 4.
118. MASS. REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 4, at 1. Specifically the executive order

notes: "[Tlhe Commonwealth has been a home and a haven for immigrants and refugees since the beginning of its recorded history .. " Id For municipal sanctuary declarations refering to a city's or nation's immigration policy, see supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
119. Id. The Executive Order states:
WHEREAS, the United States Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, authorizes the grant of asylum to refugees who are defined as any person outside
his or her country of nationality "who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
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as well as mandating that employees, agents, or agencies of the Commonwealth shall not "request information about, investigate, or assist
in the investigation of the citizenship or residency status of any person" without legal authority.12o As is also common in many municipal declarations, the order contains a prohibition against the
conditioning of benefits, opportunities, or services on citizenship or
1
residency status without legal authorization.12
Furthermore, the Massachusetts executive order also designates
the Massachusetts Office of Refugee Resettlement (MORR) as the
state agency, responsible for refugee affairs in the state,122 and ap23
points the MORR administrator as the State Refugee Coordinator.
The executive order further establishes a Refugee Resettlement System, 124 and mandates how and when state agencies conducting programs and activities directly or indirectly related to servicing the
needs of refugees are to undertake an affirmative planning process
regarding those refugees.125
New Mexico Governor Anaya's sanctuary proclamation, unlike
Governor Dukakis's executive order, openly proclaims his state to be
a "'State of Sanctuary' for Central American refugees."1 26 However,
like its Massachusetts counterpart, it mirrors the provisions of many
municipal sanctuary resolutions. For instance, Anaya's proclamation
also contains a reference to the nation's immigration heritage,127 and
likens the sanctuary movement to the underground railroad of the
Civil War era.128 In addition, Anaya's declaration, like so many municipal resolutions, refers to the Refugee Act of 1980,129 as well as the
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1982). Similar references to the Refugee Act of 1980
can be found in municipal sanctuary resolutions, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
120. MASS. REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 4, art. IV, § 4.1. For similar municipal
sanctuary declarations, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
121. Id. For those municipal sanctuary declarations which prohibit the conditioning
of benefits or services on residency status, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.

122. Id. art. I, § 1.1.
123. Id. art. I, § 1.2.
124. Id. art. II.
125. Id. art. III.
126. N.M. SANCTUARY PROCLAMATION, supra note 4, at 3.
127. Id at 1. For municipal sanctuary declarations that contain similar references
to the nation's immigrant heritage, see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
128. Id. See supra note 75 for municipal sanctuary declarations which also compare
the sanctuary movement with the pre-Civil War underground railroad.

129. Id. at 2.

1968 Refugee Protocol.130 The proclamation singles out Salvadoran
refugees in the preamble, as did the state legislature's resolution of
the previous year; 131 and as with many municipal declarations, the
proclamation commends sanctuary proponents and those working to
extend "sanctuary" to "those in need."' 132 The motivation behind
Governor Anaya's proclamation is identical to that of municipal resolutions-it is the INS (and not those providing sanctuary) who is
guilty of violating the law.133

IV.

ARGUMENTUM AD CAPTANDUM: THE PROBLEMS WITH
SANCTUARY DECLARATIONS

As previously discussed, the act of encouraging or providing sanctuary to illegal aliens is a felony punishable by up to five years incarceration.I3 4 Nonetheless, municipalities, states, mayors, and
governors have officially indicated their support of the sanctuary
movement in various ways.' 3 5 This section discusses the legal ramifications of these official imprimaturs of the sanctuary movement.
A.

FederalPreemption of Sanctuary Declarations

The constitutionality of local sanctuary promulgations is suspect on
several grounds, the first and most obvious one being their preemption by federal immigration law under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution.13 6 Guidance from judicial decisions establishing the parameters of the preemption doctrine is far from concise due to the complex and varied relationships between state and
local governments and federal law.137 Despite this ambiguity, exploring preemption in the context of sanctuary declarations is possible
130. Id.
131. Id. For discussion of the New Mexico legislature's action concerning Salvadoran refugees, see supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 3. This portion of the proclamation states:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the State of New Mexico commends
those civic and religious organizations, and the compassionate and dedicated
individual volunteers assisting these organizations, who are working in New
Mexico and throughout this country to extend the spirit of "sanctuary" to all
those in need.

Id.
133. Governor Anaya stated that:
These religious people that are involved in sanctuary are trying to uphold the
law, and if this movement is characterized successfully so, as a movement of
lawbreakers, then it will fail. But I hope that one of these days the morality
of this country will rise and recognize that it's the INS that's breaking the law
and not those that are behind the sanctuary movement.
Nightline: Interview with Toney Anaya, Governor of New Mexico (ABC television
broadcast, Apr. 1, 1986).
134. See supra notes 6, 15 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 54-133 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 144-152 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Louisana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n,

[Vol. 16: 297, 1989]

Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

using past Supreme Court decisions which construed local laws dealing with immigration and foreign affairs.
B.

State Laws Regarding Immigration

In the watershed case of DeCanus v. Bica,138 the Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether the INA preempted a California labor
law. The law at issue prohibited an employer from knowingly employing illegal aliens if such employment adversely affected lawful
resident workers.13 9 The Court found that the California law was
not per se preempted by the INA merely due to the fact that the
state statute dealt with aliens. 140 To the contrary, the Supreme
Court concluded, after analyzing California's rationale for passing the
statute, that preemption was not required due to either the "nature
of the . . . subject matter" or because "Congress ha[d] unmistakably
so ordained" that result. 14' Accordingly, the Court held that the California statute was local regulation with a purely speculative and indirect impact on federal immigration laws.142
C. Sanctuary Declarationsand ImmigrationLaw
Unlike the state legislation at issue in DeCanus, sanctuary declarations directly address matters which encompass the regulation of immigration. The Supreme Court describes the regulation of
immigration as "essentially a determination of who should or should
not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a
legal entrant may remain," a determination which is "unquestionably
43
exclusively a federal power."
Many sanctuary declarations refer specifically to the "illegal" regulatory procedures utilized by the INS in eliminating the admissibility
of aliens as being their purpose for passing the resolution or ordinance. 44 These resolutions also commend those in the sanctuary
movement who illegally bring undocumented aliens across the border
and shelter them.4 5 In addition, many of the declarations prohibit
476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) (Supreme Court identifies six various situations in which
state and local action may be preempted by federal law under the supremacy clause).
138. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
139. Id, at 352.
140. I& at 355.
141. Id at 356.
142. Id
143. Id at 354-55.
144. See supra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.

city employees from aiding or cooperating with INS officials.146
These factors clearly facilitate the stay of illegal aliens in the United
States by improving their chances of evading apprehension by federal
law enforcement officials. Prohibiting all city or state employees
from cooperating with the INS, officially encouraging those sanctuary activists illegally rendering assistance to undocumented aliens,
and encouraging illegal aliens to remain in the country by holding
out their jurisdiction as areas where such aliens may seek refuge has
prevented the federal government from adjudicating the status of
7
many illegal aliens.14
The sanctuary resolutions and declarations thereby operate to impede federal immigration procedures by simultaneously regulating
the matter locally and effectively determining for many aliens their
ability to stay in the country and under what conditions. 148 These
resolutions and declarations are thus preempted by federal immigration law, which grants the authority to determine who may remain in
149
the country only to federal immigration authorities.
Aside from being preempted due to their regulatory impact on
146. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
147. The resolution in Brookline, Massachusetts, actually states that it is the municipality's hope that the resolution's "practical effects will encourage refugees to come
to our town, to take advantage of our sanctuary and our good will." Brookline, Mass.,
Res., supra note 2, at 24-4. Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner of the INS, has declared
that "sanctuary resolutions and publicity by church groups cannot help but encourage
illegal aliens to come to the United States in the false belief that they have a basis of
support here, and may in fact even be safe from apprehension in some areas." Nelson,
The Sanctuary Movement: HumanitarianAction, PoliticalOpposition or Lawlessness,
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, June 1, 1986, at 482 (Vol. LII, no. 16). Mr. Harold Ezell,
Western Regional Commissioner of the INS, stated during deliberations on Los Angeles's short-lived sanctuary resolution that "regardless of the resolution's purpose or
content, [it] would be received as an open invitation by the rest of the world to seek a
better way of life in Los Angeles as a safe haven from the INS." H. Ezell, Minutes of
the Los Angeles Intergovernmental Relations Committee Report 2 (Nov. 27, 1985)
(Item 22, CF 85-1948).
148. Sanctuary activists have estimated that since the sanctuary movement officially began in March, 1982, it has prevented the INS from apprehending between 1000

and 1400 "refugees." Glickman, How Genuine Are Refugee Claims of Persecution?,
The Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 25, 1986, at 32, col. 4.
149. The United States Supreme Court has held local or state statutes invalid
under the supremacy clause if they conflict with federal law or stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. See, e.g., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 260 (1985); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1983); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986). The strong federal interest in
preventing illegal immigration was once again manifested in the institution of employer sanctions for hiring illegal aliens found in the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3360, (1987). By preventing the INS from adjudicating whether an illegal alien may enter the country and under what conditions
he may remain, sanctuary declarations effect a "regulation of immigration" as defined
by the Court in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). These declarations frustrate the
immigratory scheme adopted by Congress and enforced by the INS and are therefore
preempted by the supremacy clause.
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aliens within their borders and the obstacles they pose for the accomplishment of congressional objectives, some local sanctuary resolutions are void because they squarely conflict with what Congress has
duly permitted. As previously noted, several ordinances and resolutions prohibit local government employees from requesting or disseminating information concerning the citizenship or residency status
of any person or assisting in the investigation of such matters without
authorization.15 0 These local prohibitions are violated in situations
where a city or state employee might cooperate with federal authorities by assisting with securing the arrest or conviction of those sanctuary movement activists violating section 1324(a) of the INA which
prohibits the shielding, harboring, or inducing of illegal aliens into
the country.' 5 '
A direct conflict between federal law and local sanctuary declarations occurs when state or local law enforcement officials violate the
local prohibitions against cooperation with federal authorities. Congress expressly grants to local law enforcement authorities the power
to arrest those sheltering illegal aliens in violation of section 1324.
Accordingly, if a state authorizes police officers to make warrantless
arrests of those who commit felonies, local and state law enforcement
officials may do so for a violation of section 1324.152 Any conflicting
local ordinances or resolutions are void under the supremacy clause
when in direct conflict with what Congress has unmistakably
53
ordained.1
D. Asserted Legitimacy
Proponents of sanctuary declarations and some sanctuary apologists have asserted that local sanctuary resolutions or ordinances are
mere symbolic gestures. They argue the declarations are compatible
with local interests in that they provide procedures for distributing
city services, preserve state or city fiscal resources, or relate to local
150. See supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
151. For the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), see supra note 15.
152. See supra notes 8-34 and accompanying text for the legislative history of the
INA and its express grant of authority to state and local officials to enforce section
1324.
153. State or local law is preempted under the supremacy clause when an outright
or actual conflict between federal and state law arises. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663, 666 (1962); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 21 (1824). For example, in
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a local ordinance prohibiting importation of nuclear waste due to its preemption under the
supremacy clause by the Federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Id. at 1109.

law and order.154
These rationales are not, however, very persuasive. The sanctuary
declarations expressly state that the current INS procedure for regulating illegal aliens is the major factor in and motive for their passage.155 Assuming that their purported purpose is to provide
procedures for distributing city services renders the declarations
overbroad. If this were truly their purpose, then the orders prohibiting city employees and departments from requesting or disseminating
information about, or investigating or assisting in the investigation of
the citizenship or residency status of any person are superfluous. Instead, the resolution need only prohibit the conditioning of municipal
or state services on residency status. 156
It is also argued that these symbolic gestures are protected by the
first amendment.157 Far from being protected by the first amendment, however, sanctuary declarations may run afoul of it since they
constitute possible violations of state and city employee's free speech
rights.
E. FirstAmendment Implications
The prohibitions found in many sanctuary declarations banning
city or state employee cooperation with the INS unconstitutionally
interfere with the civil employee's right to aid federal law enforcement officials. In In re Quarles & Butler,158 the Supreme Court recognized the right of every citizen to cooperate with federal law
enforcement officials should they so desire. In Quarles, several defendants were convicted of conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten,
and intimidate Henry Worley for exercising a right and privilege secured to him by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. 5 9 Mr. Worley had informed a United States deputy marshal
that the defendants were violating the Internal Revenue Code by not
posting the required bond for operating a distillery.1o
The defendants argued on appeal that there existed no such right
154. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 73, at 583 (sanctuary resolutions ensure health and
welfare of inhabitants); Comment, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption
Doctrine: Much Ado About Nothing, 20 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 513, 535-56, 554 (1987) (arguing sanctuary resolutions are local procedures for providing city services, are symbolic
action, relate to law and order, and are a manner in which the city conducts local affairs). One city states that its sanctuary resolution was passed "in the interest of the
City and County of San Francisco to encourage all residents ... to report all criminal
violations without fear of inquiry into immigration status." San Francisco, Cal., Res.
supra note 2, at 1.
155. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.

156. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
157. Helton, supra note 73, at 594-95.

158. 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895).
159. Id. at 532-33.
160. Id. at 532.
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to inform federal authorities of law violations.i6 1 The Court rejected
this argument, holding: "It is the duty and the right, not only of
every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist
in prosecuting and in securing the punishment of any breach of the
peace of the United States."16 2 The Court further noted that the
right of a citizen to inform federal officials of a violation of law "does
not depend upon any of the Amendments to the Constitution, but
arises out of the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself
of a national government, paramount and supreme within its sphere
of activity."'163 Quarles equated the right of a citizen to "assist in putting in motion the course of justice" with the right of citizens to vote
without being oppressed.' 64 The existence of the right to aid federal
authorities was reiterated in dicta in Miranda v. Arizona,165 wherein
the Supreme Court observed: "[i]t is an act of responsible citizenship
for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in
law enforcement."166
The right of an individual to cooperate with federal law enforcement authorities is not terminated merely because an individual is a
city or state employee. The exercise by public employees of rights
protected by the federal constitution cannot be the cause of dismissal,167 disciplinary action, 168 or the withholding of benefits' 69 by pub-

lic employers absent those reasonable restrictions enacted to protect
substantial government interests. 70
Prohibitions against city or state employees cooperating with the
INS are neither reasonably related nor necessary to the protection of
161. Id. at 533-34.
162. Id. at 535.
163. Id. at 536.
164. Id.
165. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
166. Id. at 477-78.
167. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
168. See, e.g., Childer$ v. Independent School Dist. of Bryan County, 676 F.2d 1338
(10th Cir. 1982) (involuntary transfer); Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir.
1980) (reprimand); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978) (negative evaluation), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979); Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary School Dist.,
548 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.) (reprimand), cert denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
169. See, e.g., Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970) (attendance at professional meetings denied); Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969)
(tenure); Lake Park Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 526 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(summer school assignment).
170. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (CIA's need to enforce secrecy agreement signed by former employee "compelling"); Mt. Healthy City School
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977); Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).

substantial local governmental interests. Assuming the acceptance of
the government interests asserted as justification for such declarations-security, law and order, and establishing procedures for distributing city services-these interests are not advanced by
prohibiting public employees from cooperating with the INS. Illegal
aliens and sanctuary workers violating immigration laws are not immunized from federal prosecution merely because a city or state
desires to provide them with public assistance or protect them from
apprehension and prosecution by the INS. Morever, whether or not a
public employee cooperates with INS officials does not affect the procedures, forms, questionnaires, or policies sought to be implemented
by a city or state regarding public assistance to illegal aliens. The local government, for example, can determine the type and number of
inquiries on public assistance and service forms.171 In sum, the prohibition against city and state employee cooperation with the INS is
overbroad in relation to the governmental interests advanced by providing procedures for the distribution of city or state services or preserving, paradoxically, local law and order.172
By realistically appraising the interests of the city and state officials in passing prohibitions against public employee cooperation with
the INS, the declarations lose any semblance of legitimacy. Seeking
to facilitate evasion from prosecution by illegal aliens or sanctuary
activists due to a belief that the INS is acting illegally or that the
sanctuary activists merit our appreciation and support 1 73 is not an
"important" state or local interest on which to anchor an ordinance
banning a citizen's right to cooperate with INS officials. It is, instead,
merely a poorly disguised attempt to determine or regulate who
should be admitted into the country-an exclusively federal
171. Although Chicago's Executive Order bans assisting in the investigation of the
residency status of any person without legal authority, it also mandates that the applications, questionnaires, and interview forms used by the city be reviewed to delete any
questions regarding citizenship or residency status not legally required. Chicago, Ill.,
Exec. Order, supra note 3, §§ 3, 6.
172. In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance rendering it unlawful "to curse or revile or to use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference to police officers performing duties"
for being overbroad, since it was "susceptible of application to protected speech." I& at
132. The sanctuary resolutions, moreover, could fail on the basis they are not reasonably related to local police power at all. Courts have not avoided determining whether
a local ordinance or resolution is reasonably related to local police power or whether
such regulation furthers a sufficiently substantial governmental interest when infringing upon first amendment interests. See, e.g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68
(1981) (zoning ordinances infringed upon first amendment interests); City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (1980) (city ordinance infringed upon the right to privacy); Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419;
306 P.2d 601 (1957) (general right to enjoy and engage in lawful and innocent activity is
subject to reasonable restriction, but cannot be completely taken away under the guise
of police regulation).
173. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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1 74

interest.

F. The Right Not To Speak
Ironically, the very argument by proponents of sanctuary declarations that they are merely symbolic political gestures protected as
free speech in fact undermines the constitutionality of a declaration's
prohibition against employee cooperation with INS officials. In
7 5 the Supreme
Wooley v. Maynard,1
Court held that a state cannot
force an individual to be an instrument of an ideological point of view
with which he disagrees.176 In Wooley, a New Hampshire statute
mandated that noncommercial motor vehicles bear license plates
with the motto "Live Free or Die."17 7 The appellees viewed the
motto as repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs, and
covered up the motto on their license plates, for which they were
subsequently convicted of a misdemeanor.178 The Supreme Court upheld the district court's judgment that the state could not require the
appellees to display the state motto on their vehicle license plates.179
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the first amendment
prohibition against state action includes both "the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."180 In particular,
the Court observed that the New Hampshire statute mandating "the
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate" forced each
appellee to be an instrument for "fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 181 In concluding
that the statute was unenforceable against the appellees, the Court
held that the state's asserted interest in determining whether a vehicle was carrying proper plates could be more narrowly achieved and
that the state's interest in disseminating an official ideology cannot
outweigh an individual's right to avoid becoming the courier for such
2
a message.18
Analogously, the interest of a local or state governmental unit in
disseminating a particular point of view-be it that the INS is illegally apprehending undocumented aliens or that the administration's
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id. at 717.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.

Central American policies are misguided-cannot supercede an individual's right to avoid becoming the courier for such a view. By
prohibiting a public servant's cooperation with INS officials as part of
some sort of symbolic public speech, the pertinent ordinances or resolutions force each civil employee to acquiesce in what is essentially a
strongly ideological viewpoint. A simple perusal of the preambles addressing the rationale for promulgating sanctuary declarations leaves
18 3
no doubt that they were passed based on ideological motivations
which many will clearly disagree with on a factual as well as political
basis.184 Accordingly, those sanctuary resolutions or declarations
that restrict city or state civil employees from aiding federal law enforcement officials turn such employees into the unwilling instruments of strong ideological statements and violate their first
amendment right not to be an unwilling courier of ideological governmental statements, especially those which simultaneously restrict
the exercise of a separate constitutional right.
V.

CURRENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION

While the sanctuary activists have relentlessly continued their efforts to elicit support for their movement,18 5 neither the federal legislative or judicial branch has been remiss in fulfilling their
responsibilities regarding immigration.
183. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
184. Ruffin, supra note 5, at 596-97 (the major allegations of the sanctuary movement are for all practical purposes false); Nelson, supra note 147, at 483 (facts belie
sanctuary proponents' claim regarding persecution of Salvadorans and Guatemalans
upon returning to their homelands); Zall, Asylum and Sanctuary: The American Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 68 (charges by sanctuary movement advocates about
asylum law and policy are not substantiated). Regarding the refugees being publicized
by sanctuary proponents, one of the movement's religious activists was reported
"screening" refugees for suitability prior to use by the movement. "Sister Anna Marie,
who screens refugees, says that she warns them that entering sanctuary is not easy or
always safe, and that she chooses people she thinks are dedicated to change in Central
America and can convincingly repeat their stories." Epstein, The Long Trip To Sanctuary, 2,600 Miles on New 'Underground Railroad, The Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 25,
1986, at 7, col. 2. In one reported case, sisters believing they were helping Central
American refugees were swindled out of over $2,200. Wells, Tipping Leads to NunScam Arrest, The Cincinnati Enquirer, Dec. 12, 1986, at A-1, col. 1. In another case,
one city sanctuary resolution recommended sanctuary be given to a person who turned
out to be a member of the Communist party of El Salvador, received guerrilla training
in Cuba, met with Cuban and Soviet officials, and was determined to be a security risk
by immigration officials. See Council PassesResolution Approving Sanctuary for Refugees, United Press Int'l, Rochester, N.Y., May 28, 1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file);
Rochester Council Adapts Resolution Supporting Sanctuary Movement, The Associated Press, Rochester, N.Y., May 29, 1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file).
185. On February 23, 1987, a caravan of sanctuary activists and Salvadoran refugees
left San Franscisco for a month-long trip through the nation to speak on sanctuary
goals. See People's Daily World, Feb. 26, 1987, at S-A.
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A.

The Legislature

After many years of heated discussion, the United States Congress
finally tackled the issue of immigration reform by enacting the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.186 The Act grants amnesty
to those aliens who entered the country before January 1, 1982, and
establishes sanctions for those employers who hire undocumented
aliens.187 Due to its cutoff date, this major legislative effort fails to
provide a solution for the majority of Salvadorans and Guatemalans
who have recently immigrated illegally to the United States. 8 8 Immediately after the Act's passage, bills were introduced in both
houses of Congress which would have granted Salvadorans and
Guatemalans a temporary stay of detention and deportation.189 However, both bills were neither debated nor approved.' 90 On June 28,
1987, the House of Representatives passed legislation by a 237 to 181
margin temporarily deferring the deportation of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans illegally residing in the United States who entered the
country before January 20, 1987, and extending the cutoff date to the
end of a six-month registration period beginning on the date of the
bill's enactment.' 9 ' This legislation is now pending before the Senate. Critics of this bill argue that it will undermine the immigration
reforms enacted in 1986 and that the Salvadorans are coming to the
United States for economic rather than political reasons. Supporters
of this bill reply that the politically motivated activities of the death
squads in El Salvador are forcing these immigrants to leave their
92
country.'
Another problem with the bill is that its cutoff date of January 20,
1987, is five years beyond that of the c6rresponding Immigration and
Reform Act of 1986 cutoff date, opening the door for a chaotic, uncertain situation following the bill's six-month registration period.J 93
Even if this bill ultimately becomes law, it will not resolve the ten186. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
187. Id.
188. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at A3, col. 4.
189. See S. 332, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (providing for the temporary stay of
detention and deportation of Salvadorans and Guatemalans). The Senate bill was previously introduced in 1985 as S. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See also H.R. 1409,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (provisions similar to Senate bill, but extended to include
Nicaraguans). The House bill was previously introduced in 1985 as H.R. 822, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
190. See 1988 Cong. Index (CCH), at 21,004, 35,019.
191. H.R. 618, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
192. 64 Interpreters Releases 895 (Am. Council for Nationalities Serv. 1987).
193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.

sions generated by sanctuary activists. The exodus of Salvadorans,
Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans is expected to continue long after the
registration period lapses.
B.

The Judiciary

The courts have also dealt with immigration matters related to the
sanctuary movement. Their findings indicate that implementation of
a congressionally chosen immigration scheme is an important government interest justifying enforcement of the law.194 Further, the conviction of activists for transporting illegal Salvadorans is not barred
by the first amendment.195 Courts reject the perpetrators' belief in
the aliens' genuine qualifications for asylum196 as an adequate defense for the crime of transporting illegal aliens. Consequently, they
deny refugee organizations the right to judicial relief for assisting illegal aliens.197
On the other hand, courts protect the due process and statutory
rights of Salvadoran aliens who are taken into custody. 198 In one instance, a judge instructed the jury that confusion revolving around
New Mexico's sanctuary declaration could be a valid defense for
those accused of smuggling aliens into the country for profit,199 while
at the same time determining that the Refugee Act of 1980 was not a
defense in that case.2 00 The jury found the two defendants not
guilty. It is precisely this type of conflict and confusion between federal and state law that prompted entrustment of immigration matters
exclusively to the federal government. The supremacy clause should
lay the matter to rest.
194. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
195. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
1603 (1987).
196. United States v. Merkt, 764 F. 2d 266, 273 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 772 F.2d 904
(5th Cir. 1985).
197. American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
198. Orantes-Hernandes v. Meese, 56 U.S.L.W. 2633 (U.S. May 17, 1988).
199. In United States v. Martinez, No. 87-476 (D.N.M., Dec. 10, 1987), the judge instructed the jury "that the Sanctuary proclamation issued by New Mexico Governor
Toney Anaya had no legal effect on the enforcement of the immigration law of the
United States. Id. Further, the judge instructed that should they find:
the defendants committed the acts for which they have been charged
[they] must then consider [whether] in doing so, they acted in reasonable reliance upon the Governor's Sanctuary proclamation .... You must acquit the
defendants .. .unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that they did not
actually rely on the Governor's Sanctuary proclamation and that a reasonable
person could have relied upon the proclamation.
Id. The judge also stated that "reasonable reliance means that a reasonable person
would have acted in reliance upon the Governor's proclamation and reasonably believed that his actions were not contrary to Federal Law." Id.
200. Id. (Jury Instruction No. 29).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The sanctuary movement began as an ecumenical protest aimed at
changing United States policy in Central America. Its emergence as
a topic for municipal and state legislative and executive action is consistent with the aims of the sanctuary activists. The various declarations are likely to be cited by sanctuary proponents as independent
examples of a public ground swell against current Central American
foreign policy. 201 However, several factors prevent these declarations
from being the proper subjects for legitimate local official action.
The nomenclature of the declarations indicate they were not independently forged after painstaking drafting and measured debate.
More often than not, the declaration or resolution of one state or municipality simply mirrors that of another, indicating clause-borrowing
202
among partisan sanctuary activists in local or state offices.
Furthermore, federal law preempts these declarations. Federal
statutes expressly give local law enforcement officials the authority
to apprehend those illegally bringing aliens into the country and harboring them from federal authorities. 203 Accordingly, sanctuary resolutions or declarations prohibiting local law enforcement officials
from apprehending these wrongdoers are invalid. Moreover, the
Supreme Court expressly declares that determining who may remain
in the country and under what conditions is an exclusively federal
function;204 yet, state and local sanctuary declarations unconstitution20
ally attempt to make such determinations. 5
201. Helton, supra note 73, at 493. "The breadth of support for this effort is indicated by the nineteen municipalities and the single state that have declared themselves
safe havens, in one form or another, for Central Americans." Id. See, e.g., Takoma
Park, Md., Res., supra note 2, at 3-4. "The American people are acting in opposition to
these unjust policies ... cities in independent actions have recently enacted resolutions
... manifesting their solidarity with the Sanctuary Movement." Id. In contrast, in the
only open public vote on a sanctuary resolution, the sanctuary resolution lost. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 76-82 for sanctuary resolutions that are substantially similar
to one another. Rochester passed its sanctuary resolution after a three-hour debate observed by a packed chamber of 200 people. Rochester Council Adopts Resolution Supporting Sanctuary Movement, The Associated Press, Rochester, N.Y., May 29, 1986
(NEXIS library, Omni file). An informative Los Angeles public committee hearing degenerated into a political forum to criticize Reagan administration policies which lead
a panelist to assert that a new "sanctuary" lead policy could come from the committee.
Panel Studies Impact of Refugees on City, United Press Int'l, Los Angeles, Cal., July 2,
1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file); Reagan Policy Toward Central America Attacked,
United Press Int'l, Los Angeles, Cal., June 30, 1986 (NEXIS library, Omni file).
203. See supra notes 8-35 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 143-153 and accompanying text.

Assuming one accepts the dubious claims of some proponents that
these sanctuary declarations are legitimately addressing local concerns, they are in any event still unconstitutionally overbroad--especially those which prohibit civil employees from exercising their
constitutional right to cooperate with the INS or other federal officials.206 Likewise, these municipal and state sanctuary resolutions
and declarations, which give their official imprimatur to the illegal
activities of sanctuary activists, propound a distinctly partisan ideological viewpoint. By prohibiting state and local employee cooperation with the INS, the local governmental unit is thereby attempting
to transform civil employees into couriers of a partisan viewpoint by
207
restraining the employees' exercise of their free speech rights.

Finally, neither Congress nor the courts have been remiss in living
up to their responsibilities with regard to immigration. Congress has
been working to change existing legislation, while in the meantime,
the courts have been upholding existing law. These are precisely the
forums where the treatment of this problem belongs.
It is indeed ironic that those who purport to truly uphold the law
are instead intent on encouraging its disobedience, even to the point
of advocating the passage of improper official dictates that are unconstitutional and violative of others' constitutional rights. Hopefully,
other municipalities and states will take a more critical look at the
entire sanctuary movement, including some of the movement's factual allegations, before passing similar invalid measures.

206. See supra notes 154-174 and

accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 175-184 and accompanying text.

